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Abstract
The Paris Agreement is a milestone in international climate policy as it establishes a global mitigation
framework towards 2030 and sets the ground for a potential 1.5 ◦C climate stabilization. To provide
useful insights for the 2018 UNFCCC Talanoa facilitative dialogue, we use eight state-of-the-art
climate-energy-economy models to assess the effectiveness of the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) in meeting high probability 1.5 and 2 ◦C stabilization goals. We estimate that
the implementation of conditional INDCs in 2030 leaves an emissions gap from least cost 2 ◦C and
1.5 ◦C pathways for year 2030 equal to 15.6 (9.0–20.3) and 24.6 (18.5–29.0)GtCO2eq respectively.
The immediate transition to a more efficient and low-carbon energy system is key to achieving the
Paris goals. The decarbonization of the power supply sector delivers half of total CO2 emission
reductions in all scenarios, primarily through high penetration of renewables and energy efficiency
improvements. In combination with an increased electrification of final energy demand, low-carbon
power supply is the main short-term abatement option. We find that the global macroeconomic cost
of mitigation efforts does not reduce the 2020–2030 annual GDP growth rates in any model more
than 0.1 percentage points in the INDC or 0.3 and 0.5 in the 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios respectively
even without accounting for potential co-benefits and avoided climate damages. Accordingly, the
median GDP reductions across all models in 2030 are 0.4%, 1.2% and 3.3% of reference GDP for
each respective scenario. Costs go up with increasing mitigation efforts but a fragmented action, as
implied by the INDCs, results in higher costs per unit of abated emissions. On a regional level, the
cost distribution is different across scenarios while fossil fuel exporters see the highest GDP
reductions in all INDC, 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios.
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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1. Introduction
Building on the work that started at the Copen-
hagen and Cancun climate summits, the bottom-up
approach to climate change mitigation has been
strengthened with the Paris Agreement and the
submission of Intended Nationally Determined Con-
tributions (INDCsornowcalledNDCs).This approach
marked a fundamental shift in international climate
policy, attracting wide support and thus reaching a
participation of 195 parties representing over 98% of
global emitters. In addition to this ambitious inter-
national coverage, of major importance is also the
decision of COP21 to officially set the long-term tar-
get agreed in Copenhagen and Cancun, expressing the
aim of ‘holding the increase in global mean temper-
atures to a well below 2 ◦C and to pursue efforts to
limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ◦C’. A facilitative
dialogue, expected to start in 2018 and to reoccur at
five year intervals, shall take stock of the combined
efforts of the parties in relation to this long-term emis-
sion reduction goal and report progress to the COP.
The strengthened ambition of the long-term goal poses
new challenges for policy makers and indeed soci-
ety as a whole, but also for scientific analysis. Such
a target has long been endorsed by climate scien-
tists despite the debate surrounding its origins and
effectiveness (Cointe et al 2011, Knutti et al 2016,
Smith et al 2009, Jaeger and Jaeger 2010, Knopf et al
2012).
The scientific community is committed to pro-
viding input for a potential ratcheting-up of INDCs
and to describe possible pathways and necessary
actions towards achieving the 1.5 ◦C target in light
of the UNFCCC facilitative dialogue. Climate-energy-
economy models have a long tradition in contributing
to the global societal challenge of climate change
mitigation and in providing scientific insights to the
international climate policy proceedings. Such assess-
ments span from an analysis on the impacts of the
1997 Kyoto protocol (Weyant 1999) to assessments
of the Cancun pledges (UNEP 2010, UNFCCC 2010,
Ricci and Selosse 2013, van Vliet et al 2012, den
Elzen et al 2011, Saveyn et al 2011, Peterson et al
2011, Kriegler et al 2013, Riahi et al 2015, Lud-
erer et al 2016). Similarly, in the lead-up to COP21,
a number of analyses (Labat et al 2015, Spencer
et al 2015, IEA 2015, UNEP 2015, UNFCCC 2015)
were published to facilitate an informed negotiation
process. In the aftermath of COP21, additional analy-
ses were published, which included the agreed Paris
outcome and reaffirmed earlier findings about the
insufficiency of the INDCs in meeting the 2 ◦C tar-
get (UNFCCC 2016, Rogelj et al 2016, den Elzen et al
2016, Vandyck et al 2016, UNEP 2016, Fujimori et al
2016a).
We further add to this literature and contribute
to the ongoing scientific research by providing a first
multi-model analysis on the short-term, i.e. to 2030,
effectiveness of INDCs in relation to up-to-date sce-
narios for a well-below 2 ◦C (2 ◦C scenario) and a
high probability 1.5 ◦C (1.5 ◦C scenario) climate sta-
bilization, as presented in table 1. We discuss the
contributions of different sectors and different green-
house gases and describe the transition of the energy
system. Our analysis concludes with an estimation
of global macro-economic mitigation costs. Through
this, we aim to provide a first harmonized multi-
model assessment of the INDCs alongwith 1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C
consistent stabilization scenarios. We expect that this
analysis can potentially provide quantitative input
to the upcoming UNFCCC Facilitative Dialogue on
Enhancing Ambition and Support in 2018. Our multi-
model assessment enhances the robustness of our
findings and provides an insight on the range of
uncertainty of model results, due to both an inher-
ent uncertainty of the quantification of INDCs (Rogelj
et al 2017) and to the different modelling methodolo-
gies, techno-economic and structural assumptions of
each model. Moreover, we provide a first multi-model
short-term estimation of high probability 1.5 ◦C emis-
sion pathways and subsequent system requirements.
Current literature includes very limited 1.5 ◦C scenar-
ios (UNEP 2016), the majority of which assumes that
global mitigation action to reach this target started in
2010 (IPCC 2014, Rogelj et al 2015) and can thus
be considered as out of date given the existing pol-
icy framework. An even smaller number of scenarios
assume the introduction of global carbon prices in
2020 but only ensure a 50% chance of meeting the
1.5 ◦C target (Rogelj et al 2015, UNEP 2016). Our set
of scenarios fill the 1.5 ◦C scenario gap (UNEP 2016)
as we implement a carbon budget that is in line with
achieving with a high probability (> 66% chances)
temperature increase below 1.5 ◦C by the end of the
century. Comparability and equity considerations of
the regional global mitigation effort as well as legal
implications of the agreement are beyond the scope
of this analysis.
2. Methods
2.1. Scenario set-up
Our set of scenarios enables the assessment of
INDCs towards the 1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C climate targets.
They are described briefly in table 1 and in more
detail in the supplementary material available at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/13/044039/mmedia.
2.2. Models
The eight state-of-the-art climate-energy-economy
models that participate in this analysis feature different
characteristics and model structures, providing further
robustness of results. A brief description is provided in
table 2, while more information can be found in the
supplementary material.
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Table 1. Brief description of scenarios.a
Scenario name Description Climate stabilization constraint
Reference Realistic achievement of 2020 Cancun pledges. Low
climate policy ambition in the post-2020 period.
No
INDC Realistic achievement of 2020 Cancun pledges. Full
implementation conditional INDCs by 2030. Fragmented
climate action after 2030 with following a reduction of
carbon intensity as in 2020–2030 period.
No
2 ◦C Realistic achievement of 2020 Cancun pledges. Post-2020
cost-optimal global mitigation action to keep total CO2
emissions to within a 800 GtCO2 carbon budget in
2016–2100.
>67% chance to stay below 2 ◦C (for more details on the
climate evaluation please refer to Luderer et al
(in review))
1.5 ◦C Realistic achievement of 2020 Cancun pledges. Post-2020
cost-optimal global mitigation action to keep total CO2
emissions to within a 200 GtCO2 carbon budget in
2016–2100.
>67% chance to return to below 1.5 ◦C in 2100 (for more
details on the climate evaluation please refer to Luderer et
al (in review))
a The 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios correspond to the B200|1.5C-T2100| > 67% and B800|2C-Tmax| > 67% scenarios in Luderer et al (in review).
Table 2. Brief description of participating models.
Model name Model type Disaggregated economic
sectors
Land use emissions GHG coverage
AIM/CGE Computable GE model Yes Yes All
GEM-E3-ICCS Computable GE model Yes No All, no CO2 from
industrial processes
IMACLIM Computable GE model Yes No Only CO2, no CO2 from
industrial processes
IMAGE Energy-Land PE model No Yes All
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM Energy system—GE
growth model
No Yes All
POLES Energy system-PEa model No Yes All
REMIND Energy system—GE
growth model
No Yes All
WITCH-GLOBIOM Energy system—GE
growth model
No Yes All
a PE: Partial equilibrium, GE: General equilibrium.
3. Results and discussion
This section presents the results of the numerical
simulations of the scenarios presented in section 2.
Simulations have been conducted by all eight partici-
pating models and the results throughout the text are
presented as a median of all model results, while min-
imum and maximum values of the eight model results
are provided in the brackets unless indicated otherwise.
In all boxplot figures the top of the rectangle indicates
the third quartile, the horizontal line near themiddle of
the rectangle indicates the median, while the bottom of
the rectangle indicates the first quartile. We note that
especially with regards to the ranges of GHG emission
levels, these do not include GEM-E3 and IMACLIM
models, as they do not have a full coverage of GHG
emissions.
The first subsection of this section discusses the
emission pathways for each scenario and the emis-
sion reduction contributions by different GHGs and
by economic sectors. Next, we analyze the energy
system transition that is in line with the climate pol-
icy constraints, with a particular focus on the power
supply and the transport sector. Finally, we present
the short-term macroeconomic costs of the mitigation
action for each scenario, covering both direct and indi-
rect costs but not taking into consideration avoided
climate damages nor any potential co-benefits of the
mitigation action.
3.1. Emission pathways
In the absence of the Paris pledges, the implemen-
tation of current policies (reference scenario) leads
to an increase of global emissions at a rate of 0.7%
(0.4%–1.1%) per annum during 2010–2050, reaching
60.3 (56.6–64.6)GtCO2eq in 2030 (table 3), and peak
after 2050 in all models, if at all by 2100. Along such
trajectories the global mean temperature, projected by
the global climate model MAGICC612 (Meinshausen
et al 2011) shows a 3.4 ◦C (2.9◦–3.8◦) temperature
increase by the end of the century compared to
pre-industrial levels and thus falls far short of the cli-
mate stabilization targets agreed in Paris, and exposes
the world to severe climate risks (e.g. IPCC 2014,
World Bank 2012).
12 All temperature results mentioned in the text refer to year 2100
and to the 50 percentile output ofMAGICC6model. The ranges that
are provided include the 50% temperature across models for year
2100, thus full climate uncertainty is not covered.
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Table 3. GHG emissions levels in 2030 and GHG, GDP and final energy trends in 2010–2050 for all scenario and models.
Mean annual global GHG emissions in 2030 Mean annual change in 2010–2050
Absolute level Versus 2010 Versus reference GHG GDP Final energy
Reference AIM/CGE 63.6 24% 0.8% 2.6% 1.1%
GEM-E3/ICCSb 52.8 26% 0.8% 2.5% 1.4%
IMACLIMa 41.7 36% 1.2% 2.9% 1.8%
IMAGE 56.6 18% 0.5% 3.0% 1.1%
MESSAGE 57.4 11% 0.4% 3.8% 1.4%
POLES 61.8 33% 1.0% 2.6% 1.2%
REMIND 64.6 29% 1.1% 2.6% 1.6%
WITCH 58.9 24% 0.7% 2.5% 1.6%
INDC AIM/CGE 54.5 7% −14% −0.3% 2.6% 0.9%
GEM-E3/ICCSb 47.0 12% −11% −0.2% 2.4% 1.0%
IMACLIMa 39.2 28% −6% 0.7% 2.9% 1.6%
IMAGE 53.8 12% −5% −0.1% 3.0% 0.8%
MESSAGE 53.7 4% −6% −0.4% 3.8% 1.2%
POLES 50.1 8% −19% −0.5% 2.6% 0.9%
REMIND 56.6 13% −12% 0.3% 2.6% 1.5%
WITCH 48.8 3% −17% 0.0% 2.5% 1.5%
2 ◦C AIM/CGE 36.0 −30% −43% −2.8% 2.5% 0.5%
GEM-E3/ICCSb 43.6 4% −17% −2.5% 2.3% 0.4%
IMACLIMa 31.6 3% −24% −2.6% 2.7% 0.7%
IMAGE 38.3 −20% −32% −2.8% 3.0% −0.1%
MESSAGE 40.4 −22% −30% −2.1% 3.8% 0.8%
POLES 41.1 −11% −34% −2.8% 2.6% 0.6%
REMIND 41.0 −18% −37% −2.4% 2.6% 1.1%
WITCH 28.5 −40% −52% −2.1% 2.4% 0.8%
1.5 ◦C AIM/CGE 25.5 −50% −60% −9.4% 2.5% 0.1%
GEM-E3/ICCSb 23.9 −43% −55% −3.8% 2.2% 0.1%
IMACLIMa 26.6 −13% −36% −8.2% 2.4% 0.2%
IMAGE 35.3 −27% −38% −9.2% 3.0% −0.2%
MESSAGE 27.9 −46% −51% −4.0% 3.7% 0.3%
POLES 30.8 −34% −50% −5.7% 2.6% 0.0%
REMIND 33.1 −34% −49% −4.5% 2.5% 0.9%
WITCH 21.5 −55% −64% −3.5% 2.2% 0.4%
a IMACLIM only covers CO2 emissions.
b GEM-E3/ICCS does not include LULUCF emissions.
The implementation of high-ambition INDCs
(conditional INDCs) brings global emissions down
by 8.5 (2.8–11.7) GtCO2eq compared to the reference
scenario, thus reaching 53.7 (48.8–56.6)GtCO2eq in
2030. Our range of results confirms earlier estima-
tions of conditional INDC GHG levels that refer to
51–56GtCO2eq (UNFCCC 2016, Rogelj et al 2016,
UNEP 2016). By keeping the ambition of post-2030
climate policies similar to that of the INDCs, namely by
following an annual decarbonization rate equal to that
of 2020–2030, we find that the average annual growth
rate of global GHG emissions becomes only marginally
negative for most models in 2010–2050, while emis-
sions peak in the 2020–2030 period. However, with
such an assumption on future climate policies, the
temperature increase by the end of the century is still
higher than the commonly agreed climate stabiliza-
tion goals, reaching the range of 2.6 ◦C (2.4 ◦C–3.1 ◦C)
as evaluated with MAGICC6 (see also Luderer et al
(in review) for a more detailed climate evaluation).
In the cost-optimal 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios all
models find that global emissions peak in 2020, namely
when the global climate mitigation action begins with
the introduction of a global carbon price. GHG emis-
sion levels in 2030 fall to 39.3 (28.5–41.1) and 29.4
(21.5–35.3)GtCO2eq respectively, corresponding to
a 34% (19%–52%) and 53% (36%–64%) reduction
from reference levels. The implementation of condi-
tional INDCs in 2030 leaves an emissions gap (UNEP
2015) of 15.6 (9.0–20.3) and 24.6 (18.5–29.0)GtCO2eq
for the 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C targets respectively (see
figure 1).
We find that our 2030 2 ◦C emission levels are on
the lower end of the IPCC AR5 scenarios that are
reported in the literature (UNEP 2016, Rogelj et al
2015), in part due to a later starting year of global
climate action in our scenarios. Comparing our 1.5 ◦C
estimationswith existing literature ismore challenging,
since relevant estimations are very limited and based
on different assumptions (i.e. earlier starting year of
global climate action and higher carbon budget for the
period 2011–2100, as described in section 2). Our high
probability 1.5 ◦C scenario falls well below the emission
levels of earlier estimations that report a level of 2030
global GHG emissions equal to 33 (26–40)GtCO2eq
(Rogelj et al 2015) and 39 (37–40) GtCO2eq (UNEP
2016), while other recent publications (Robiou du
Pont et al 2017) provide an estimation of 29GtCO2eq
but exclude LULUCF and bunker emissions and
are thus not comparable. Our estimations are lower
than the findings of the literature so far, primar-
ily due to the construction of our scenarios which
4
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Figure 1. (a) Global emission trajectories for 2010–2050. (b) Global GHG emissions in 2030. The graphs do not include emission
projections from GEM-E3/ICCS and IMACLIM models as these do not have a full coverage of GHG. The shaded areas (funnel)
exclude WITCH results as the respective 2 ◦C levels fall in the 1.5 ◦C range making funnels less visible.
features increased chances of meeting the 1.5 ◦C tar-
get (higher than 66% chance instead of higher than
50% chance). In addition, our implementation of a
global mitigation action 10 years later than most IPCC
AR5 scenarios, i.e. in 2020, results in a smaller available
carbon budget for the period 2020–2100.
Apart from the intrinsic uncertainty of GHG emis-
sion projections, different historical emissions across
participating models may also explain the wide emis-
sions range. In particular, historical emissions are
an important consideration, as INDC targets are largely
expressed in relation to historical base years. In line
with the above, our harmonized quantification of
INDCs is expressed in relation to 2010 emission levels.
The differences in historical emissions across mod-
els can be explained by the usage of different data
sources (EDGAR, UNFCCC, CAIT and PRIMAP)
as well as by the different calibration years of each
model. While the use of different data sources can pro-
vide an indication of the adjacent uncertainty ranges
5
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Figure 2. Average yearly reduction rates of CO2 intensity (CO2 emissions per GDP). The calculation excludes LULUCF emissions.
IMACLIM, IMAGE, POLES and REMIND model results are not included in the 2030–2050 boxplot for the 1.5 C scenario as their
CO2 intensity reduction rates reach 45%/yr.
of emission trajectories, a harmonization of sources
remains a challenge for future model ensemble analy-
ses. In order to understand the potential significance of
a data harmonization process, we isolate this uncer-
tainty by using the uniform scaling harmonization
approach (Rogelj et al 2011). For this we select the
average 2005 global GHG emissions of all models as a
reference value to adjust all GHG projections. We find
that this harmonization results in a somewhat reduced
range of results, but also in systematically lowermedian
values, with emissions gaps of 15.6 (9.1–19.8) for the
2 ◦C and to 22.0 (17.8–27.0) for the 1.5 ◦C targets. All
results described in the subsectionsbelowhavenot been
adjusted with this harmonization process.
The rate of decarbonization of the economy
(namely the reduction of carbon intensity of GDP)
is slower in the period 2010–2030 than in 2030–
2050 in all scenarios (figure 2). Implementing the
INDCs leads to an improvement of carbon intensity
towards a rate that exceeds the 1990–2010 average
by 1%. The carbon intensity improvement rates of
the climate stabilization scenarios in 2010–2030 are
below the observed rates of Europe and Central Asia
in the period 2004–2014, which are equal to −6%,
while in the period 2030–2050 the rates are above
the highest observed improvement rate of the 2004–
2014 period, which is equal to −11%, thus posing a
real challenge for the achievement of this transition.
Around 80% of emission reductions in 2030 in
all scenarios come from the reductions of the domi-
nant GHG, CO2. With regards to the rest of the GHG,
CH4 contributes by around 13%, F-gases by 4% and
N2O by 3%. In particular, F-gases mark the highest
reduction compared to the reference scenario for most
models, ranging from 16% in the INDC scenario to
72% in the 1.5 ◦C scenario. This indicates the cheap
abatement potential of F-gases assumed in most mod-
els, also in line with the Kigali Agreement of 2016
that sees an 80%–85% reduction of HFCs in 204513
compared to reference projections. On the contrary,
N2O emissions mark the lowest relative reductions in
all scenarios, as emissions from agricultural soils have
limited abatement options (Smith et al 2014).
In terms of sectoral contributions, in 2030 the
power sector continues to have the highest share of
direct CO2 emissions in both reference and INDC sce-
narios (figure 3(a)), while its emissions rapidly fall
in the climate stabilization scenarios, even below the
emission levels of the industry and transport sectors.
We find that the decarbonization of the power sup-
ply sector accounts for around 50% of total CO2
emission reductions in all scenarios. The implemen-
tation of INDCs contributes substantially to that end,
as it achieves 37% (18%–59%) of sectoral reduc-
tions of the 2 ◦C scenario and 24% (13%–45%) of
the 1.5 ◦C reductions. Although the effectiveness of
INDCs is noteworthy in the power supply sector,
also demand sectors, and especially transportation,
register emission reductions induced by the INDCs
(figure 3(b)) that account for more than 15%–20%
13 Decision XXVIII/1 Further Amendment of the Montreal Pro-
tocol. http://ozone.unep.org/sites/ozone/files/pdfs/FAQs_Kigali_
Amendment.pdf
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Figure 3. (a) Global direct CO2 emissions by sector in 2030. (b) Contribution of INDCs to the sectoral emission gap for 2
◦ C and
1.5 ◦C. GEM-E3 and IMACLIM results do not include CO2 process emissions.
of the respective sectoral reductions observed in the
1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C scenarios. The decarbonization of the
remaining energy demand sectors is more expensive
and thus emission reductions are less pronounced.
The overall contribution of the industry sector to
total emission reductions in 2030 varies from around
12% in the INDC to 20% and 18% in the 2 ◦C and
1.5 ◦C scenarios respectively. The transport sector
contributes by around 12% to total CO2 reductions
in all scenarios, while the respective share of the
buildings sector is close to 6%. However, the trans-
port sector is the only sector whose emissions in
2030 in the decarbonization scenarios are higher than
2010 levels. This is mainly due to increasing demand
from emerging economies (Lennert and Schoenduwe
2017), both for private transportation and freight,
thus leaving further scope for decarbonization later in
the century.
7
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Figure 4. Global final energy demand by sector in 2030. WITCH model is not included in the graph due to limited sectoral
representation.
3.2. The energy transformation gap
The moderate ambition of the INDCs results in a
slow and restrained transformation of the energy sys-
tem. We here use sectoral indicators to quantify and
analyze the energy transformation gap, i.e. the dif-
ference in these transformation indicators between
INDC scenarios and cost optimal 1.5 and 2 ◦C
scenarios. Final energy intensity of the global econ-
omy in 2030 is 25% (20%–44%) lower than 2010
levels but only 3% (1%–8%) below reference levels.
In the 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios final energy intensity
of GDP improves at a much faster pace than under the
INDCs. Already in 2030 energy intensity reductions are
deep, falling below 2010 levels by 34% (25%–50%) and
39% (30%–57%) respectively.
On a sectoral level (figure 4), industry plays
the key role in total energy savings, depicting a
large untapped potential for energy efficiency mea-
sures. In the INDC scenario in 2030, reductions
in industrial final energy demand constitute 38%
(7%–58%) of total energy reductions from refer-
ence. Much deeper reductions are seen in the climate
stabilization scenarios as the INDC industrial final
energy reductions are only a fraction of the latter
(12% (2%–68%) of 2 ◦C reductions from reference
and 9% (1%–45%) of 1.5 ◦C reductions from ref-
erence). The contribution of industry in total final
energy reductions is close to 45% in the climate sta-
bilization scenarios, while the buildings and transport
sectors contribute by around 27% each in all scenarios.
The role of industry in total energy savings is facili-
tated by the use of more efficient energy carriers, and
in particular by the extended electrification of various
industrial processes and energy needs.
Power supply is the dominant mitigation sector,
undergoing a low-carbon transformation in all sce-
narios (see figure 5). The implementation of INDCs
increases the share of zero-carbon14 power supply in
2030 by 7 (1–14) percentage points from reference
levels, reaching a share of 48% (40%–63%) of zero-
carbon electricity. The respective share is 15% (5–34)
percentage points higher in the 2 ◦C power mix and
34% (12–40) percentage points higher in the 1.5 ◦C
one (figure 5 (a)). All models find that the penetra-
tion of renewable energy is the driving force of this
transition. Wind energy has the most notable growth
pattern, increasing sevenfold by 2030 from 2010 lev-
els in the INDC scenario and registering a share of
16% (8%–25%) and 24% (8%–29%) in 2 ◦C and
1.5 ◦C scenarios respectively (figure 5 (b)). Solar power
is also a key zero-carbon technology increasing its
share in global power supply from an almost zero
in 2010 to 4% (1%–13%) in 2030 in the INDC and
7% (4%–23%) in the 1.5 ◦C scenario. Nuclear power
sustains a share similar to that of 2010, increasing
only by 8% (5%–18%) in the 1.5 ◦C scenario.
14 Zero carbon power supply includes all renewable power supply
(including all hydro and biomass production) as well as nuclear
power.
8
Environ. Res. Lett. 13 (2018) 044039
A
B
Figure 5. (a) Share of zero-carbon power in global power supply in 2030. (b) Share of nuclear, solar and wind production in the global
power mix in 2030.
The transport sector shows a less rapid low-
carbon transition and thus its decarbonization remains
a challenge for the period after 2030. Results (fig-
ure 6) indicate that the transition is already taking
place in 2030 in the reference scenario but the share
of non-fossil final energy demand in transportation
increases only marginally with the implementa-
tion of the INDCs and remains roughly the same
in the 2 ◦C scenario. As shown in figure 3(b),
transport CO2 emission reductions in the INDC
scenario are equal to 50% of the 2 ◦C sectoral
reductions, the highest share across all sectors. How-
ever, the INDC reductions are around 20% of the
reductions registered in the1.5 ◦Cscenario,wherenon-
fossil final energy demand in transportation reaches
13% (7%–27%) (figure 6). The electrification of the
global transport sector is found close to 2% of the
sector’s energy demand in the reference and INDC
scenarios and increases to around 4% in the 2 ◦C
and 1.5 ◦C scenarios. Similarly, the share of biofuels
in the INDC scenario reaches 6%, and increases only
to an 8% share in the 1.5 ◦C scenario.
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Figure 6. Share of non-fossils in transport final energy demand in 2030. In WITCH model the transport sector includes only road
transport.
3.3. Macroeconomic costs of mitigation action
Moving to a low-carbon system is a capital-intensive
process and entails a reallocation of resources that
can result in economy-wide policy costs (Paltsev and
Capros 2013). Cost estimates vary widely across mod-
els depending on the assumptions for technological
progress and technology costs, marginal costs for avail-
able abatement options, the overall and sectoral model
responsiveness to carbon prices, the model-specific
price elasticities, the level of sectoral and regional dis-
aggregation of each model and more. A multi-model
analysis can provide some insight into the level of
uncertainty of cost estimations (Iyer et al 2015).
We contribute to the literature by providing a
multi-model assessment of the short-term costs of
implementing of the Paris Agreement mitigation tar-
gets for 2030 (INDCs) along with cost estimations for
achieving the 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C targets with a >66%
probability. To our knowledge, there is no cost esti-
mation of a high probability 1.5 ◦C scenario in the
literature. Our analysis includes a subset of the partici-
patingmodels, as not all models feature an endogenous
macroeconomic representation. We calculate the total
costs of a low-carbon transition, as we do not only
cover the direct costs of emission reductions (as for
example in Iyer et al (2015)), but also the indirect
macroeconomic impacts of this transition. However,
our estimations only consider the costs of mitigation
and do not include any potential co-benefits of climate
action or the benefits from avoided climate damages.
In our 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C decarbonization scenarios
costs are minimized (IPCC 2014) as we implement
a global, unified mitigation framework where reduc-
tions are undertaken by the sectors and regions with
the lowest marginal abatement costs. On the con-
trary, INDC emission reductions assume a fragmented
mitigation action and are thus expected to result in
suboptimal burden sharing and increased costs (Aldy
et al 2016, Fujimori et al 2016b). In addition, it
is important to note that a cost-optimal mitigation
framework, like in our 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios,
does not address any equity considerations (Raupach
et al 2014), but can serve as a benchmark to indicate,
among other things, the cost-optimal level of abate-
ment as well as sectors where abatement is cheaper.
Equity considerations along with other supplementary
policies, like technology transfer, financing schemes
and the removal of trade restrictions, could address
other socioeconomic considerations or UN sustain-
able development goals (SDGs), but this is out of the
scope of this analysis.
Wefindthat thepaceof economicgrowth is affected
by climate change mitigation action only to a lim-
ited degree. Global annual GDP growth rates in the
period 2020–2030 remain close to reference levels,
namely close to 3% in most scenarios and models. The
most striking reduction in global annual GDP growth
rates for the same period is registered in the 1.5 ◦C
scenario, equal to 0.36 (0.21–0.48) percentage points
compared to the reference (table 4). This is much
lower than the uncertainty of the pace of economic
growth, as can be seen in the different assump-
tions on reference annual GDP growth rates across
models, covering a range from 2.8% to 4.6%.
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Figure 7. Total costs of mitigation in 2030: GDP (bar chart) in relation to GHG reductions (markers), all as % change from reference.
Table 4. Average annual global GDP growth rates in 2020–2030
period in all scenarios. IMAGE and POLES models are not included
as they feature an exogenous GDP.
REF INDC 2 ◦C 1.5 ◦C
AIM/CGE 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.6%
GEM-E3-ICCS 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.6%
IMACLIM 3.1% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6%
MESSAGE 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 4.0%
REMIND 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.6%
WITCH 2.8% 2.8% 2.6% 2.3%
All models register increasing costs with increas-
ing abatement efforts. In 2030 the implementation
of INDCs results in a global macroeconomic cost
of 0.4% (0.1%–1.2%) of the reference GDP, similar
to the findings of other macro-economic assessments
(Vandyck et al 2016). In the 2 ◦C scenario the respec-
tive cost is 1.2% (0.5%–4.5%). To put this number
into context we calculate GDP costs from the public
IPCC AR5 WGIII Scenario database15, using results
on GDP impacts for 450 ppm scenarios16, and find
that costs are of comparable magnitude, equal to
1.6% (0.7%–6%) of reference GDP. Further, in accor-
dance with the IPCCmethods of presenting mitigation
costs (IPCC 2014), we compare private consump-
tion losses, reported by AIM/CGE, GEM-E3-ICCS,
IMACLIM and MESSAGE-GLOBIOM models. We
find that the scale of impacts is similar to that of
GDP costs, namely a loss of 1.2% (0.4%–2.5%) of
reference consumption in our 2 ◦C scenario and a
15 IPCC AR5 Scenario database https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB/
dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about.
16 We used the AMPERE and LIMITS databases taking stock of all
models that feature endogenous macroeconomic variables.
loss of 1.7% (1.0%–3.7%) in the IPCC scenario
set which is described above.
The rapid decarbonization required already in
2030 in order to achieve the 1.5 ◦C target results in
higher costs as we move to the part of the global
marginal abatement curve with the steepest slope once
cheap mitigation options have been exploited in lower
ambition scenarios. GDP impacts in the 1.5 ◦C sce-
nario are equal to 3.3% (2.1%–7.1%) of reference
GDP and consumption losses equal to 3.6% (1.6%–
4.6%) of reference consumption. In figure 7we provide
the GDP changes in relation to total GHG reductions
for each model, so as to highlight the model-specific
responsiveness to carbon prices and other resource
restrictions that are adjacent to mitigation action. The
different responsiveness results in different costs per
unit of abated emissions for each model. The graph
illustrates that in addition to the different assump-
tions and model properties that result in varying cost
estimations, costs may differ due to different abate-
ment efforts with regards to the reference scenario
of each model. We note that the mitigation effort in
the climate stabilization scenarios is continued beyond
2030, and that costs might increase further beyond
that date.
Despite these differences across models, we cal-
culate an average abatement cost (the ratio of GDP
losses to GHG reductions relative to reference) which
is similar across most models, within the range of
60$2005/tCO2eq for the INDC and 2 ◦C scenarios
and 110$2005/tCO2eq for the 1.5 ◦C scenario. Find-
ing that the average abatement cost of the INDC
and 2 ◦C scenarios is roughly the same confirms the
above-mentioned earlier findings (Aldy et al 2016,
Fujimori et al 2016b, Blanford et al 2014), namely
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that a fragmentedaction, like the INDCscenario, results
in higher costs per unit of abated emissions.
While our analysis focuses on the global scale, we
briefly discuss here the regional distribution of abate-
ment efforts and mitigation costs so as to highlight any
findings that could prove useful for a future assess-
ment of effort allocation schemes. According to our
2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenario set-up, we implement a cost-
optimal mitigation so that global costs are optimally
minimized without any further assumptions on bur-
den sharing. We find that economic costs, expressed
in terms of GDP reductions from reference levels, are
shared differently across regions amongst the frag-
mented and the cost-effective, climate stabilization
scenarios. High income economies, like USA, EU28,
Canada and Japan, contribute substantially to the mit-
igation effort in the INDC scenario and thus have high
regional GDP costs when compared to the reference
(see figure 8). On the contrary, in the cost-efficient
global decarbonization scenarios, emerging economies
like China, India and Brazil take up most of the
mitigation efforts due to untapped cheap abatement
potentials, thus resulting in higher GDP reductions rel-
ative to the reference than those seen in high income
economies. Nevertheless, a common characteristic can
be identified in all scenarios, namely that the fossil
fuel exporting regions, particularly Middle East, Rus-
sia and Indonesia, see high costs compared to the
rest of the regions both due to declining global fos-
sil fuel demand that leads to diminishing exports but
also due to the carbon intensive structure of their
economies.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a multi-model assessment of
the effectiveness of the INDCs in achieving the well
below 2 ◦C and the 1.5 ◦C climate stabilization targets.
We provide a detailed description of the low-carbon
mitigation pathways which are consistent withmeeting
these targets, as well as an estimation of the macroeco-
nomic costs of mitigation. Through this, we contribute
with scientific insights on the scale of a potential ratch-
eting up of INDCs and suggest sectors with untapped
abatement potentials. The participation of eight state-
of-the-art models enhances the robustness of results
and provides an estimation of the uncertainties of
future emission projections and policy costs.
Our results indicate that the INDCs pledged under
theParisAgreement inducesubstantial emission reduc-
tions, getting to 53.7 (48.8–56.6)GtCO2eq in 2030.
However, we find that this effort is not adequate to
put the world on a 1.5 ◦C or even a well below 2 ◦C
emissions path. By keeping the ambition of post-2030
climate policies equal to the effort required for mov-
ing from the Cancun to the INDCs emission levels, the
temperature increase by the end of the century com-
pared to pre-industrial levels would reach on average
2.6 ◦C. Significant ratcheting up of INDC aspirations
is required in order to put the world on track for a
well below 2 ◦C or even 1.5 ◦C stabilization. In 2030,
additional emission reductions of 15.6 (9.0–20.3) and
24.6 (18.5–29.0)GtCO2eq respectively would be con-
sistent with the 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C cost-optimal emission
trajectories.
We find that all sectors can further contribute to an
increased mitigation effort even after the implemen-
tation of INDCs. The decarbonization of the power
supply sector accounts for more than half of total
emission reductions in all scenarios and is primarily
achieved through the intensive deployment of renew-
able power technologies. Efforts for a zero-carbon
power supply are crucial for the global short- to
medium-term mitigation efforts while carbon lock-in
investment decisions between now and 2030 would
put these efforts at risk. Demand-side emission reduc-
tions contribute less to the INDC mitigation effort
but become more crucial for the climate stabilization
scenarios, where deep emission reductions in indus-
try become important from 2030 onwards. Industry is
found to have the largest energy saving potential, as it
contributes close to 45%of total final energy reductions
in the climate stabilization scenarios. Sector-specific
measures could further increase the available demand-
side potential. Overall, a deeper transformation of the
energy systemremains a challenge that canbeaddressed
with more ambitious climate policies in order to keep
with the Paris goal of ‘well below 2 ◦C’.
The assessment of the macroeconomic cost of the
low carbon transformation shows that global annual
GDP growth rates are only marginally reduced by the
climate stabilization action and even less so by the
INDC implementation. Interestingly, the fragmented
mitigationactioncommissionedunder theParisAgree-
ment is found to have the same average abatement
cost (the ratio of GDP losses to GHG reductions rel-
ative to reference) with a global, common mitigation
action for achieving a ‘well below 2 ◦C’ climate stabi-
lization, thus indicating its inefficient burden sharing.
On a regional level, the highest costs in all scenarios
are seen in the fossil fuel exporting regions, making the
diversification of their economies towards alternative
economic activities and the gradual decarbonization
of their energy systems pivotal in order to avoid sig-
nificant adverse economic impacts. In the 2 ◦C and
1.5 ◦C scenarios, emerging economies take up the
biggest mitigation efforts and face the highest eco-
nomic costs. Cooperation mechanisms, coordinated
financing schemes, technology transfer and capacity
building, as foreseen inArticle 6of theParisAgreement,
could alleviate the disproportionate costs while still aim
for a cost-effective mitigation.
A further advancement of the work presented in
this paper could include a detailed mitigation analysis
along with an integrated assessment of avoided dam-
ages of climate change and the potential co-benefits of
the adjacent climate policies.
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Figure 8. Regional allocation of GDP costs in 2030: GDP losses in relation to total CO2 reductions, both as % change from reference.
The size of each bubble shows the share of each region in global GDP losses and is indexed to the size of maximum and minimum
values as indicated in the graph (AIM/CGE;Brazil and IMACLIM;China). (a) INDC scenario, (b) 2 ◦C scenario, (c) 1.5 ◦C scenario.
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